The Oslo Accords Are Dead — And the Palestinians Know It

In September 1993, the world watched an extraordinary scene on the White House lawn: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat shaking hands under the gaze of US President Bill Clinton. The Oslo Accords were born — hailed as a bold new roadmap to peace and Palestinian statehood.

For Israel, it meant recognising the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and agreeing to a staged withdrawal from certain territories. For the Palestinians, it meant recognising Israel’s right to exist, renouncing terrorism, and committing to resolve all outstanding disputes through direct negotiations.

It was not a final peace agreement, but a carefully sequenced process: build trust, transfer powers, develop Palestinian self-governance, and within five years, negotiate the so-called “final status” issues — borders, refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, and security.

The underlying bargain was simple: Palestinians would gain statehood if they demonstrated they could live peacefully alongside Israel; Israel would take the risks of territorial withdrawal in return for security and peace.

What Oslo Required

The Accords laid out clear, mutual obligations:

1. Mutual Recognition — Israel recognised the PLO; the PLO recognised Israel’s right to exist in peace and security. 
2. Phased Transfer of Powers — Civil and some security responsibilities would be handed to the new Palestinian Authority (PA) in defined stages. 
3. Security Cooperation — The PA would “take all measures necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, crime, and hostilities” against Israel and Israelis. 
4. Negotiated Final Status — All final status issues — borders, refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, security arrangements — would be resolved through bilateral talks, not unilateral actions or external imposition. 
5. No Unilateral Actions — Neither side would take steps to alter the status of the territories before final status negotiations concluded. 

Where It Fell Apart

The early years saw partial implementation. The PA was established. Elections were held. Israel withdrew from major Palestinian population centres (Areas A) and handed over civil control in Areas B. Joint patrols and security cooperation began.

But by the late 1990s, momentum was already slowing. The Camp David talks in July 2000 collapsed without agreement. Weeks later, the Second Intifada erupted — a five-year campaign of suicide bombings, shootings, and rocket fire that killed over 1,000 Israelis and many more Palestinians. Trust — the lifeblood of Oslo — drained away almost overnight.

In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza, dismantling all Jewish settlements and pulling out every Israeli soldier. Rather than use this as a springboard for nation-building, Hamas and other terror groups turned Gaza into a base for attacks (a conservative estimate of 35,000 projectiles launched from Gaza into Israel since 2005). In 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections, and by June 2007 it had violently ousted the PA from Gaza. Oslo had assumed a single Palestinian leadership capable of enforcing peace. Instead, there were now two rival Palestinian entities: the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza.

At the same time, Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank continued, deepening Palestinian scepticism. But settlement activity, however controversial, was not Oslo’s fatal blow — terrorism, political fragmentation, and the abandonment of direct negotiation were.

The Palestinian Bypass Strategy

When negotiations failed, the PA pivoted away from Oslo’s bilateral track and towards what can only be called a diplomatic end-run.

• UN Recognition — In 2012, the PA secured “non-member observer state” status at the United Nations, bypassing Israel entirely. 
• International Criminal Court — The PA joined the ICC and began pursuing war crimes charges against Israel. 
• Bilateral Recognition — Palestinian diplomats worked country-by-country to secure recognition, framing Israel as the obstacle and portraying statehood as a right to be granted rather than a negotiated outcome. 

All of these steps violate Oslo’s explicit prohibition on unilateral moves. They may generate headlines, but they do nothing to resolve borders, security arrangements, refugees, or Jerusalem.

Hamas took an even starker route: rejecting Oslo outright, seizing Gaza by force, embedding rocket launchers in civilian areas, and waging war with Israel while exercising totalitarian control at home.

Both strategies share the same flaw: they seek the benefits of statehood without delivering on the fundamental commitments Oslo required — peaceful coexistence, security cooperation, and direct negotiation.

Why Oslo Is Dead

The Oslo Accords are not just “stalled” — they are dead. The conditions for final status talks do not exist. The PA has not met its commitments to prevent terrorism and negotiate in good faith; Hamas openly rejects peace and recognition of Israel; and Israel no longer believes the Palestinians can or will uphold their side of the bargain.

International actors calling to “revive Oslo” ignore this reality. Oslo cannot be revived unless the Palestinian leadership is unified, committed to non-violence, and willing to settle final status issues at the table rather than through UN resolutions or armed conflict.

Until that happens, the two-state solution will remain a slogan — one that hides the fact that the Palestinian leadership’s current path is not towards peace, but towards confrontation and evasion of their own obligations.

If there is to be a just and lasting peace, the first step is honesty: Oslo failed because the Palestinians (split between Fatah and Hamas) either could not or would not meet the deal’s most basic conditions — renouncing violence, dismantling terror groups, and negotiating directly. The responsibility to change course lies squarely with them.