In May 2024, three Western democracies — Ireland, Norway, and Spain — formally recognised “Palestine” as a state. Others, including New Zealand, have made increasingly assertive gestures in the same direction. These moves are being celebrated in some circles as a step toward peace and justice. But a closer look reveals a very different picture: one of political theatre masking legal fiction.
It is one thing to advocate for Palestinian self-determination. It is another entirely to bypass the core legal standards of international recognition, reward factions that reject coexistence, and create diplomatic illusions that may only deepen conflict rather than resolve it.
The Montevideo Criteria: The Legal Gold Standard for Statehood
The foundational test for whether an entity qualifies as a state in international law is set out in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933). This is not a fringe or outdated doctrine — it has guided legal recognition for nearly a century. The convention lays out four essential criteria:
- A permanent population,
- A defined territory,
- A functioning government, and
- The capacity to enter into relations with other states.
These are not arbitrary requirements. They exist to ensure that recognised states have the stability, internal cohesion, and accountability necessary to participate responsibly in the international system. On close inspection, the entity known as “Palestine” — split between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas — fails to meet three of the four.
No Defined Territory: A Disputed Concept with No Internal Agreement
One of the most basic requirements for statehood is clear, defined borders. Yet there is no internal Palestinian consensus on what those borders should be. The Palestinian Authority claims the so-called “1967 borders” (the 1949 armistice lines), while Hamas’s charter openly declares that all of historical Palestine, including Israel in its entirety, is Islamic land that cannot be compromised.
Even if the international community were to endorse the pre-1967 lines, these are neither recognised nor agreed upon in any binding peace treaty — and certainly not accepted by Hamas. In short, “Palestine” is not only undefined geographically but contested even among Palestinians themselves.
No Functioning Government: A Divided Leadership Without Legitimacy
The lack of a unified, functioning Palestinian government is not a temporary political hiccup — it is a systemic and long-term failure. Since the violent Hamas coup in Gaza in 2007, the Palestinian territories have been governed by two separate and hostile regimes:
- The Palestinian Authority (PA) in parts of Judea and Samaria (West Bank), dominated by Fatah, and
- Hamas, a U.S., EU, and New Zealand-designated terrorist organisation, ruling Gaza with an iron fist.
The two entities have made repeated but failed attempts at reconciliation. Elections have not been held since 2006. Hamas refuses to recognise Israel, while the PA increasingly lacks democratic legitimacy and internal support. This is not a government-in-waiting — it is a fractured and dysfunctional political apparatus, riven by violence, corruption, and extremism.
A state must have a single, legitimate government capable of administering services, enforcing laws, and engaging with the international community. Palestine has none of these.
No Control Over Territory: Multiple Sovereigns, None Sovereign
Under the Montevideo Convention, a state must have effective control over its territory. Yet the Palestinian leadership does not exercise full sovereignty over any part of the territory it claims.
- In Gaza, Hamas rules with a private army of terrorists, but relies heavily on smuggling, aid, and foreign patronage — including from Iran and Qatar. It has no control over its airspace, maritime borders, or economy.
- In Judea and Samaria, the PA governs only Areas A and B under the Oslo Accords. Area C, which constitutes the majority of the territory, remains under Israeli security and civil control. Moreover, terror groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad operate with relative impunity.
There is no unified legal or administrative system across the Palestinian territories. Governance is fragmented between competing authorities – Fatah in Judea and Samaria and Hamas in Gaza – each enforcing its own laws and institutions. Critically, the Palestinian leadership does not possess a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, a core requirement of sovereign statehood under political theory and international law. Armed factions such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other militias operate independently of (and often in defiance of) any central authority. These groups maintain their own weapons stockpiles, conduct military operations, and exert territorial control. This decentralisation of armed power means the Palestinian Authority (or any purported Palestinian state) cannot claim effective control over its population or territory. Nor can it defend its borders, suppress internal violence, or prevent foreign interference. All of this undermines the core criteria of sovereignty as defined by the Montevideo Convention and customary international law.
Limited Diplomatic Capacity: Symbolism over Sovereignty
Supporters of Palestinian statehood often point to the PA’s observer status at the United Nations and its missions in various capitals. But recognition by some countries does not in itself make an entity a state — and diplomatic visibility is not the same as diplomatic capacity.
The PA has no ability to enter binding treaties as a full sovereign equal. It relies on international bodies for advocacy but does not contribute meaningfully to international law, peacekeeping, or commerce. Meanwhile, Hamas is shunned, sanctioned, and designated a terrorist entity by much of the democratic world.
The ability to engage in international relations must be backed by political legitimacy and independence — not dependence on foreign proxies or a campaign of emotional lobbying.
Rewarding Terrorism, Undermining Peace
Perhaps most dangerously, recognising “Palestine” as a state today means rewarding political failure and terrorist violence. Hamas, which currently rules Gaza, is responsible for the October 7, 2023 massacre — the deadliest single-day attack on Jews since the Holocaust. It glorifies martyrdom, uses civilians as human shields, and diverts humanitarian aid toward building rockets and terror tunnels.
To confer statehood now would be to confer legitimacy on a terror regime that does not seek peace — but permanent war. It would signal to the world that international law is secondary to international pressure.
Would the international community entertain the idea of granting UN membership to ISIS? Of course not. So why is Hamas, whose tactics and ideology closely mirror that of ISIS, treated differently?
Statehood Must Be Earned — Not Declared into Being
The cause of Palestinian self-determination is not served by premature recognition. It is served by the hard work of negotiation, compromise, institution-building, and peace-making.
Statehood must be earned through:
- The establishment of democratic institutions,
- The renunciation of terror,
- The acceptance of Israel’s right to exist,
- And the ability to govern responsibly.
The road to peace runs through Ramallah and Jerusalem — not through unilateral declarations in European parliaments or symbolic votes in the UN General Assembly. Until the Palestinian leadership chooses peace over propaganda and unity over division, Palestine will remain a political project — not a legal state.
Conclusion: Don’t Bypass the Law to Appease Politics
The push to recognise “Palestine” despite its failure to meet basic legal criteria is not a triumph of justice. It is a capitulation to political pressure. It undermines the very legal principles that underpin international order — and emboldens actors who seek the destruction of Israel, not peaceful coexistence with it.
If the world wishes to support Palestinian aspirations, it should demand the same standards it expects of every other state — and stop pretending that international law can be bent to suit political fashion.
