Shared Roots, Shared Values: Why Iran and Israel’s Historical Bond Still Matters Today

Public discourse often presents Iran and Israel as irreconcilable adversaries. This perception, while reflective of current state-level hostility, obscures a much deeper historical reality: the Iranian and Jewish peoples share one of the world’s longest continuous civilizational relationships, rooted in mutual respect, cultural coexistence, and, at key moments, protection and solidarity.

Unlike many regions where Jewish populations experienced repeated expulsions, Jewish life in Iran persisted continuously for more than two millennia (Amanat, 2011). Communities flourished in cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, Hamadan, Yazd, and later Tehran, contributing to commerce, medicine, scholarship, and the arts. While conditions varied across historical periods, as they did for many minority groups in the region, the defining feature was continuity. Iranian Jewish communities were not transient; they were woven into the social and economic fabric of Iranian society.

Recognising this shared history is not an exercise in nostalgia. It is essential for understanding why many Iranians today reject the ideological hostility promoted by the Islamic Republic and why expressions of solidarity with Israel, particularly against extremist forces, have become increasingly visible despite severe repression.

From Cyrus the Great to a Tradition of Pluralism

The foundations of Iranian-Jewish relations date back over 2,500 years to Cyrus the Great, founder of the Achaemenid Empire. After the conquest of Babylon in 539 BCE, Cyrus issued a decree allowing exiled peoples, including the Jews, to return to their homeland and rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem. In Jewish tradition, Cyrus is remembered as a liberator and a just ruler, one of the few non-Jewish figures spoken of with reverence in the Hebrew Bible (Foltz, 2016). In Iranian historical memory, Cyrus symbolises principles that defined Persian imperial governance: religious tolerance, cultural pluralism, and respect for local traditions (Suren-Pahlav, 1999).

Another historical episode often overlooked in contemporary discussions is that the connection between Persians and Jews did not end with the Achaemenid era. Historical accounts note that when the Sassanid Persian Empire captured Jerusalem from the Byzantines in 614 CE, Jewish communities were once again permitted to return to the city. In the long memory of the Jewish people, these moments reinforced the perception of Persia not merely as a distant imperial power, but as a civilisation that, at critical junctures, enabled Jewish religious and communal restoration.

These and so many others across the history were not isolated episodes. They established a precedent for coexistence that endured across centuries, shaping a relationship between Persian and Jewish communities that outlasted empires, conquests, and religious transformations.

Iran as a Place of Refuge in the 20th Century

Iran’s record of coexistence extended into the modern era. During the rule of HIH Reza Shah, the first king of Pahlavi dynasty, despite the existing geopolitical pressure and resource scarcity during the World War II, Iran became a critical transit and refuge point for displaced populations, including Jewish refugees fleeing Europe.

Thousands of Polish refugees, many of them Jewish survivors, passed through Iran after release from Soviet labour camps. Iranian civilians and local networks provided assistance at a time when many countries were unwilling to do so. While Iran was not unique in offering refuge, this episode also reinforced a longstanding societal capacity for humanitarian accommodation.

The 2nd Pahlavi Era: Pragmatic Cooperation and Communal Security

Under HIH Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, relations between Iran and Israel developed into a pragmatic partnership. Although often discreet due to regional sensitivities, cooperation spanned trade, agriculture, water management, and security. Domestically, Iran’s Jewish community, which was one of the largest in the Middle East outside Israel, enjoyed recognised minority status. Jewish schools, synagogues, cultural institutions, and parliamentary representation existed, and Jewish Iranians played prominent roles in business, academia, medicine, and the arts.

Following the Six-Day War in 1967, increasing Arab hostility toward Israel resulted in energy shortages and restrictions on oil supplies to countries maintaining relations with Israel. During this period, Iran became one of Israel’s most important energy partners, supplying crude oil that helped sustain Israel’s economy and industrial activity despite regional embargo pressures. This cooperation was facilitated through discreet bilateral arrangements reflecting the strategic alignment between Tehran and Tel Aviv at the time.

Economic relations between the two countries expanded steadily during the late 1960s and 1970s. Bilateral trade reportedly reached several hundred million US dollars annually by the mid-1970s, making Iran one of Israel’s most significant regional trading partners outside Europe. Cooperation extended beyond energy into agriculture, infrastructure, and water resource management (Yissachar, 2024). Israeli technical expertise contributed to irrigation modernisation, arid-land farming practices, and water planning initiatives in parts of central and southern Iran. Companies such as the Tahal Group participated in feasibility studies, water engineering projects, and planning activities aimed at improving urban and industrial water supply systems.

These growing exchanges were accompanied by broader societal interaction. Commercial delegations, engineers, agricultural specialists, and academics travelled between the two countries, reinforcing professional and technological cooperation. Within Iran, the relative stability of this period enabled Jewish Iranians to expand participation in economic and professional sectors, including commerce, medicine, higher education, and industry, further illustrating the comparatively integrated position of the community during the late Pahlavi era.

The Post-1979 Rupture: Ideology Versus Society

In 1979, a coalition of Islamist revolutionary forces and left-leaning political movements (e.g., from Marxist-Leninists) marked a sharp departure from the previous relationship between Iran and Israel. Hostility toward Israel became a core pillar of the Islamic Republic’s ideological identity. Yet it is essential to distinguish state doctrine from societal sentiment.

Even today, Iran remains home to the largest Jewish population in the Middle East outside Israel. Their continued presence, despite constraints, pressures, and silencing, underscores that the regime’s hostility does not reflect a civilisational or universally shared societal consensus. This long coexistence produced shared cultural elements such as linguistic influences, music, cuisine, and social customs that remain evident today among Iranian Jews in Iran, Israel, and the global diaspora. It was only after the establishment of the fundamentalist system in 1979 that the majority of Iran’s Jewish population emigrated. This long continuity, followed by a rapid demographic decline linked to ideological transformation, illustrates how recent the rupture truly is when viewed against the broader arc of history.

In recent years, observable shifts in public sentiment have increasingly originated within Iran itself. Acts of everyday resistance to state propaganda have become more visible, particularly during nationally broadcast events such as football matches and large public gatherings, where majority have openly rejected official slogans and narratives concerning Israel and regional policy.

These expressions of dissent have frequently centred on opposition to the regime’s regional agenda, including its sponsorship of militant proxy groups, support for Hamas through the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), involvement in Lebanon through Hezbollah, and broader foreign interventions perceived by many citizens as occurring at the expense of domestic welfare. Numerous documented instances show ordinary Iranians quietly resisting official narratives. Widely circulated video footage has shown citizens deliberately avoiding participation in regime-organised spectacles, including refusing to step on Israeli flags placed at entrances to mosques or universities. Such small but symbolically powerful acts indicate a persistent societal distinction between imposed ideology and personal conscience.

Another example of public divergence from state ideology dates back to the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in New York, when groups of Iranians gathered in Tehran to express solidarity with the American people and Jewish communities who had lost loved ones in the attacks. Reports indicate that these peaceful gestures were discouraged and negatively portrayed by state media, and later on, the state narrative changed to describe this tragedy as “a great lie” following the typical anti-American narrative (RadioFarda, 2011).

Rather than emerging primarily from diaspora activism, these attitudes developed internally before resonating among Iranian communities abroad. Through migration, sustained communication networks between Iranians inside and outside the country, and the rapid expansion of social media platforms, diaspora communities increasingly echoed and amplified sentiments that had first taken shape domestically. This dynamic suggests that evolving public attitudes toward the regime’s regional policies are rooted in lived social and economic realities within Iran before finding expression on the global stage.

Current Events and the Voice of the Iranian People

During recent regional crises, particularly following the October 7 attacks and subsequent escalations, visible expressions of solidarity between Iranian and Jewish communities intensified across Western countries. Iranian expatriate groups in cities across North America, Europe, and Oceania participated in vigils and public gatherings alongside Jewish communities, signalling a notable shift from symbolic sympathy toward active joint mobilisation. Furthermore, Israeli flags appeared alongside the historic Iranian tricolour bearing the Lion and Sun in many of the demonstrations held by Iranians, reflecting an emerging shared civic space grounded in opposition to violent extremism and ideological authoritarianism.

This convergence has become increasingly visible in recent years, with Israeli and Iranian participants attending the same rallies, commemorations, and advocacy events. The growing presence of Israeli symbols within Iranian-led demonstrations, and reciprocal participation by Jewish communities, suggests that societal relations between the two peoples are in some respects closer today than at any point since the rupture of diplomatic relations in 1979. Parallel developments have also been observed inside Iran, where protest chants have openly criticised the regime’s support for militant proxy groups and questioned the diversion of national resources toward regional ideological conflicts.

These developments have begun to influence international political discourse. Prominent Western policymakers, including Secretary Marco Rubio and President Donald J. Trump, have publicly emphasised the distinction between the Iranian people and the Islamic Republic’s governing institutions, highlighting that hostility toward Israel originates from state ideology rather than societal consensus. Such statements reflect a broader recognition that popular attitudes within Iran and among its diaspora cannot be equated with official foreign policy positions.

The resilience of Iranian-Jewish connections is therefore not accidental. It reflects deeper shared values, including respect for scholarship and learning, strong family and communal structures, diasporic adaptability, and historical memory shaped by survival and continuity. These commonalities help explain why solidarity repeatedly resurfaces even under intense political pressure

A Call for Shared Responsibility

Starting from January 2026, protests across Iran intensified following internal repression, economic collapse, and regional military actions linked to the IRGC. Independent reports and human-rights organisations documented mass casualties, in some accounts reaching more than 32000, alongside widespread arrests and systemic crackdowns (McClure and Parent, 2026).

At the same time, notable public reactions emerged both inside Iran and across the diaspora. Many Iranians expressed support for actions targeting senior regime figures and IRGC commanders, viewing them not as national defenders but as instruments of repression and regional destabilisation. These responses were not endorsements of war; rather, they reflected a rejection of an apparatus associated with internal violence, suppression of dissent, and the global export of extremism.

Recent appeals published jointly by Jewish and Iranian writers have highlighted this convergence of public sentiment. An article published in The Times of Israel in mid-January 2026 outlined ways in which Jewish communities worldwide could support Iranian civil society (Hakakian and Klein Halevi, 2026). 

These appeals emphasised practical steps such as engaging with Iranian diaspora organisations, amplifying verified information about events inside Iran, supporting solidarity initiatives, and encouraging democratic governments to adopt firmer positions toward institutions directly responsible for repression, particularly the IRGC, which functions as the regime’s primary enforcement mechanism.

This call for solidarity has not been one-sided. Jewish commentators have acknowledged that during periods of crisis affecting Israel and Jewish communities globally, Iranian expatriates were among the few non-Jewish groups visibly participating in public demonstrations of support. Such moments of mutual recognition demonstrate that people-to-people relationships can endure even when official state narratives promote hostility.

The international community, including governments, civil society actors, and diaspora networks, therefore has multiple avenues to support Iranian society. Among the most important is informed engagement: understanding the context of Iranian citizens’ opposition to politicised religion and authoritarian governance, supporting independent civil-society voices, and aligning policies against institutions linked to repression and transnational extremism. Nowadays, many Iranians advocate a transition toward democratic and pluralistic governance, led by HIH Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, aimed at establishing a political framework grounded in accountability and coexistence.

The Jewish and Iranian communities, both globally and within New Zealand, share a profound interest in confronting antisemitism, religious extremism, and authoritarian violence. History shows that cooperation between Iranians and Jews is not new; it is deeply rooted. Today, that shared legacy offers a basis for renewed solidarity grounded not in governments, but in peoples.

Reclaiming this historical perspective does not erase present tensions. Rather, it challenges the assumption that hostility is inevitable and reminds us that political systems may change while civilisational ties endure. Recognising and amplifying this perspective is therefore not merely advocacy; it is an affirmation of historical continuity and moral clarity.

Resources:

Amanat M. JEWISH IDENTITIES IN IRAN: Resistance and Conversion to Islam and the Baha’i Faith. 2011. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.49-2249.

Foltz RC. Iran in world history. Oxford University Press; 2016.

Hakakian R, Klein Halevi Y. An appeal to Jews: Stand with the Iranians | The Times of Israel. The Times of Israel 2026. https://www.timesofisrael.com/an-appeal-to-jews-stand-with-the-iranians/ (accessed February 15, 2026).

McClure T, Parent D. Disappeared bodies, mass burials and ‘30,000 dead’: what is the truth of Iran’s death toll? The Guardian 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/27/iran-protests-death-toll-disappeared-bodies-mass-burials-30000-dead (accessed February 10, 2026).

RadioFarda. US State Department thanks Iranians for their sympathy for 9/11 victims (in Persian). RadioFarda 2011. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f12_us_state_department_thanks_iranian_sympathy_with_sept_11_victims_in_2001/24324962.html (accessed February 22, 2026).

Suren-Pahlav S. Cyrus the Great: The Father and The Liberator. 1999.

Yissachar O. Ideally – The Vision of the IDSF Featuring: Israel–Iran Relations – IDSF. IDSF 2024. https://idsf.org.il/en/interviews-en/iran-israel-relations/ (accessed February 22, 2026).

* This article was written by professionals with expertise in policy analysis and diaspora affairs, who have chosen not to publish under individual names. The authors have chosen to remain anonymous.