When The Elders was launched in 2007 at Nelson Mandela’s initiative, it presented itself as an organisation whose influence would derive not from political office or institutional power, but from the experience, judgment and independence of its members.¹ Former presidents, prime ministers, diplomats and human rights advocates would use their collective authority to help address some of the world’s most difficult conflicts through dialogue, independence and moral leadership. The organisation’s authority, therefore, rests not simply on the prominence of its members, but on the expectation that their judgments are informed by careful listening, engagement and a willingness to test competing claims before reaching public conclusions.

This week, a delegation comprising Chair Mary Robinson, Deputy Chair Graça Machel, former New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, and Pakistani jurist and human rights advocate Hina Jilani travelled first to Amman, where they met Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, before continuing to Ramallah for discussions with Palestinian Foreign Minister Varsen Aghabekian Shahin.² Following those meetings, The Elders issued a public statement expressing alarm at accelerating settler violence in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), the deterioration of Palestinian health and education services, and Israel’s withholding of Palestinian tax revenues. It concluded that these developments were making life “increasingly untenable” for Palestinians and risked triggering further violence.³

The statement did more than express humanitarian concern. It also made a specific policy recommendation, calling on Israel to release Palestinian tax revenues. In doing so, The Elders also moved from analysis to advocacy. That is entirely legitimate, but advocacy founded upon claims of independent moral authority invites legitimate scrutiny of the process by which those conclusions are reached.

A Familiar Pattern

This statement does not stand in isolation.

The delegation’s engagement continued beyond Ramallah, extending to Jordan, Israel and Lebanon.⁴ Following a meeting with Israeli President Isaac Herzog, Robinson and Clark gave extended remarks to journalists in Jerusalem – not a brief addendum, but a substantial public appearance. They warned of the potential disappearance of the Palestinian territories, and accused the Israeli government of seeking to make Palestine “disappear physically, economically, culturally and politically,” and called for an end to Israeli “impunity”.⁵ Robinson herself acknowledged that the Herzog meeting had been contentious: “We disagreed on a number of points.”⁶ Herzog’s office, for its part, said the discussion had raised the “deep pain and trauma” felt by Israelis since October 7, alongside what it described as the international community’s silence on the sexual violence committed that day.⁷ Notably, it was the Israeli presidency itself, not this essay, that characterised the outcome: a spokesperson told AFP that Herzog had “categorically rejected their one-sided criticism of Israel’s conduct during this war.”⁸ 

That assessment did not come from a critic of The Elders. It came from the office of the head of state they had just met. Whatever one makes of Herzog’s characterisation, its substance points to the same pattern this essay has already traced through Amman and Ramallah: extensive, forceful public commentary following meetings with Palestinian and Jordanian officials, and a comparatively muted public reflection of the concerns Israeli officials say they raised in turn.

The result is not the appearance of a delegation carefully reporting the totality of its engagement. It is the appearance of a delegation selecting which parts of that engagement to emphasise publicly.

The question is not whether these concerns are legitimate. It is whether an organisation whose credibility rests upon independent judgment demonstrated the inquiry necessary to sustain that credibility.

These are serious issues. Extremist settler violence deserves unequivocal condemnation, the Palestinian Authority faces significant financial pressures, and humanitarian conditions in parts of the territory have deteriorated. 

That omission does not mean The Elders’ conclusions are wrong. It does, however, leave unanswered an important question: how were the explanations offered by the Israeli Government for the policies under criticism considered before those conclusions were published?

Judea and Samaria cannot be understood solely through the humanitarian concerns identified in The Elders’ statement. Israel’s security posture in Judea and Samaria has been shaped by decades of suicide bombings, shootings and other terrorist attacks, continuing activity by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, repeated Iranian efforts to establish militant infrastructure there, and persistent attempts to smuggle weapons into the territory. Whether Israel’s responses are proportionate is open to debate, but they form part of the context in which those decisions are made.⁹

Likewise, the Palestinian Authority’s fiscal crisis is not explained solely by Israeli policy. Longstanding governance failures, corruption, declining public legitimacy,¹⁰ and continuing disputes over the transfer and deduction of clearance revenues all contribute to its present circumstances.¹¹ Observers may disagree with Israel’s legal or political justification for withholding portions of those revenues, but understanding the dispute requires acknowledging that both sides advance competing claims.

Recognising these complexities does not diminish Palestinian hardship or excuse extremist settler violence. It simply reflects the reality that the conflict cannot be understood by hearing one set of explanations alone.

Organisations that claim moral authority derive their credibility not merely from the stature of their members, but from the integrity of their methods. Courts hear opposing parties before reaching judgment. Public inquiries test competing evidence before making findings. Diplomacy likewise depends upon engaging those with whom one disagrees. Confidence in any public judgment depends not only on what is concluded, but on how that conclusion is reached. 

The Elders ask to be regarded as something more than an advocacy organisation. Their influence derives from the belief that they bring independence of judgment to the world’s most intractable disputes. That claim necessarily invites scrutiny of the methods by which those judgments are reached.

Advocacy is not incompatible with moral authority. But moral authority depends upon confidence that advocacy has followed inquiry rather than preceded it.

For New Zealanders, Helen Clark’s participation gives this episode additional significance. As one of the country’s most prominent international figures, her involvement inevitably lends weight to the organisation’s work and to the public statements issued in its name.

Nothing in this critique suggests that The Elders were obliged to endorse Israeli policy or to reject the concerns they raised in Ramallah. Nor does it imply that every visit to the region must allocate equal time to every party.

Rather, it asks a narrower question.

Can an organisation claiming independent moral authority demonstrate that it has genuinely weighed competing perspectives when its public statement reflects almost exclusively one side of those discussions?

The public record of this visit documents meetings with Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli leaders. It also documents a public statement whose analysis and recommendations overwhelmingly reflect one side of those conversations.

That does not mean The Elders reached the wrong conclusions.

It does raise a legitimate question about whether their published conclusions adequately reflect the breadth of the engagement they undertook.

An organisation that asks to be judged by a higher moral standard should expect its methods to be judged by that same standard.

That is not principally a question of political balance.

It is a question of institutional credibility.

References

1. The Elders. “Who We Are.” Accessed 18 July 2026. https://theelders.org/who-we-are.
2. Jordan Times. “Foreign Minister, The Elders Delegation Discuss Regional Developments.” July 2026. https://jordantimes.com/news/local/foreign-minister-the-elders-delegation-discuss-regional-developments   
3. The Elders (@TheElders). “Elders Mary Robinson and Helen Clark met with Palestinian Foreign Minister Varsen Aghabekian…” X (formerly Twitter), July 17, 2026. https://x.com/TheElders/status/2077675703999328417?s=20  
4. RNZ, “Helen Clark on the ‘disappearing’ prospect of Palestinian statehood,” July 2026, https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/739158/helen-clark-on-the-disappearing-prospect-of-palestinian-statehood
5. Arab News, “Two ex-leaders warn of threat to future Palestinian state,” July 2026, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2651301/middle-east
6. RTE, “Israeli govt wants to make Palestine disappear – Robinson,” July 2026, https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2026/0717/1583824-mary-robinson-israel/
7. RNZ, “Helen Clark on the ‘disappearing’ prospect of Palestinian statehood” (as above)
8. New Arab, “Former world leaders warn of threat to future Palestinian state,” July 2026, https://www.newarab.com/news/former-world-leaders-warn-threat-future-palestinian-state
9. Israel Policy Forum, “The West Bank: The Forgotten Fourth Front,” July 24, 2025. https://israelpolicyforum.org/2025/07/24/the-west-bank-the-forgotten-fourth-front/ 
10. World Bank. Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2024.
11. Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (Paris Protocol), April 29, 1994, Annex V to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.